Introduction
To interpret something is to bring out its meaning so as to understand or explain it. Interpretive theorists argue that the human sciences characteristically, and unlike the natural sciences, are about interpreting interpretations. The human sciences understand or explain texts, actions, and other such objects by bringing out the meanings, intentionality, or beliefs of the relevant actors, where these meanings, intentionality, and beliefs are themselves attempts to understand or explain the world. To interpret or explain people's actions and so the practices to which they give rise, we have to grasp their interpretations of the world, that is, the conscious, subconscious, and unconscious reasons, beliefs, and desires on which they act.
In this essay I offer just such an interpretation of both Territory and Power (the book by Jim Bulpitt) and territory and power (the main objects studied in that book). 1 An interpretive approach suggests that to understand texts, actions, and social practices we need to grasp the meanings that animate them, where these meanings are inherently contingent and historical, rather than epiphenomena of given interests, social norms, or cultural and institutional patterns. 2 The first two parts of this essay interpret Bulpitt's text by locating it respectively in its historical and contemporaneous contexts. I argue there that Bulpitt's text belongs in a broader movement to rethink the state in a way that accommodates the rise of new behavioral topics while defending a modernist and empiricist approach to institutions and other mid-level topics against the positivism and general theories of behavioralism.
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Later the final part of the essay will point to an interpretive approach to the state as an alternative to the behavioralism and institutionalism that lurk behind Bulpitt's ideas.
A thoroughly interpretive approach would decenter territory and power, revealing them to be contingent and shifting products of struggles over meanings, struggles in which cultures and institutions are continually interpreted anew as the beliefs and discourses of some actors come to dominate, obscure, and even obliterate those of other actors.
Historical Background
The study of politics long centered on the state conceived as a sovereign authority. This concept of the state arose gradually and contingently through the Renaissance and Reformation, culminating in the great texts of Jean Bodin and Thomas
Hobbes. 3 However, once this particular concept of governance -the state as sovereign authority -had arisen, it proved remarkably powerful and resilient. It inspired political actors to remake the world in its image, most famously in the Treaty of Westphalia, which enshrined it as a principle of international relations. Moreover, as it became more and more entrenched in political life, so many students of politics began to take it for granted, or at least to treat it as a natural development. Even in the early twentieth century, Max Weber's influentially defined the state as possessing a monopoly over legitimate physical violence within a well-defined territory. 4 Bulpitt's Territory and Power both echoes and challenges this concept of the state.
Territory appears but less as a monolithic sovereignty than as a complex network of intergovernmental relations. Power is there but almost entirely shorn of the normative tones associated with legitimacy and authority. Bulpitt the common good of a people bound together by pre-political ties. Second, social science grasped the character of any particular state through a historical understanding of the emergence of a pre-political nation. Third, representative institutions, perhaps together with a constitutional monarchy, enabled citizens to hold accountable political actors who embodied, acted on, and safeguarded the common good of the nation.
Johann Kaspar Bluntschli is a neglected figure. Yet his account of the state was arguably the single most influential work on the subject in the nineteenth century, acting as a founding text for the rise of political science not only in Germany but also America.
Bluntschli adopted a form of developmental historicism, defining the state as a "moral 6 and spiritual organism." 5 He offers a critical account of other concepts of the state before turning to detailed discussions of representative democracy and constitutional monarchy.
In both cases, he traces the historical development of a set of political institutions that appear as the expression of the moral organism, and he pays particular attention to their relationship to the historical culture of specific nations.
Modernism and New Empirical Topics
Bluntschli's decline from a pre-eminent voice to a neglected one reflects two overlapping but separate trends in political science. Although these two trends tended over time to mutually reinforce one another, each had had its own roots, and participation in one did not necessitate participation in the other. By the end of the interwar period empirical research on public opinion, parties, and pressure groups was coming to be known collectively as the study of "political behavior." The state of the discipline volume put together by the APSA in the 1940s not only stressed the pervasiveness of this phrase, but even went so far as to hold that "political behavior has largely replaced legal structures as the cardinal point of emphasis among political scientists." 12 Even if this claim was an overstatement, it rightly suggests that the study of political behavior was prominent in American political science before the onset of the "behavioral revolution".
Behavioralism
The "behavioral revolution" thus represented less a change in empirical topics and more the rise of a new theory that stood in some contrast to modernist empiricism as well as developmental historicism. To specify what was new about behavioralism, we must remember that new empirical topics had arisen long before. Many behavioralists had substantive interests in public opinion, pressure groups, and other phenomena outside formal government structures, but these interests simply extended an intellectual trend dating from the turn of the century. Likewise, when behavioralists such as David Easton argued that the state was a dubious and empirically unknowable entity and so of no real scientific interest, they were echoing and extending the complaints earlier made by the pluralists. Again, while behavioralism got much support from the Committee on Political Behavior (CPB), which was established in 1949 by the Social Science Research Council, the main goals of the Committee were not, despite its name, to promote the study of behavioral topics. Rather, the common theme of articles that arose from the CPB was the demand that political science become "systematic." 13 The focus was on how to study politics, not what topics to study.
The CPB had two declared goals: "development of theory" and "improvement in notably from these studies. He explicitly rejects the languages of "constitutional designs"
and "formal powers and functions", complaining they neglect "political process". 16 He advocates instead more behavioral concepts and foci. ; and yet these "centrally appointed officials may escape direct control and supervision from the Centre, be colonized by local interests and behave as quasiautonomous local notables." 18 Bulpitt describes a territorial politics in which the center tries to use its power to obtain autonomy over foreign and economic affairs while generally leaving administrative matters to the periphery. He points to "a structure of territorial politics in which the Centre is prepared to allow considerable autonomy to peripheral governments and political organisations, so long as they do not challenge its autonomy in matters of 'High Politics'." 19 His focus is on the behavior of central elites -the strategies, decisions, and informal moves by which they promote their interests. This focus inspires an account of British politics very different from the formal institutions of the Westminster Model.
The central elite is often insular, complacent, and arrogant, and it lurches from crisis to crisis with little ability directly to impose its will on the periphery. For example, he explains that the center adopted indirect rule over the periphery because, despite involving some patronage, it was generally cheap, and yet this pattern of indirect rule left the periphery to administer itself, thereby resting "the sort of policies the Crown could pursue" and fostering "greed, corruption, and internal feuding amongst the collaborative elites involved"; it resulted in "the inability, or unwillingness, of the English court to support its peripheral agents during periods of trouble or follow consistent policy over time." 20 Local elites can even capture representatives of the center, thereby undermining the center's formal authority over them. Indeed, Bulpitt explicitly argues that "few local elites, even the most servile, are completely assimilated to the Centre's norms." 21 Thus, "local elites are often administratively ineffective, they stand between the ordinary citizens and the central authorities, and since they have their own interests to defend, there may be certain policies of the Centre which they refuse to execute." 22 Britain thus appears less as a unitary state than as a complex matrix of diverse and negotiated patterns of rule.
While Bulpitt adopts the new behavioral topics, he has little time for the general theories of the behavioral revolution. To the contrary, he argues that approaches derived from the general sociology of organization have "not been very successful", and he then describes his task as "conceptual repair" rather than the creation of new methodologies or 13 general theories. 23 In concentrate on problems that were historically specific to certain countries at certain points in time, and that the field would lose contact with such problems if it pursued "excessive abstraction." 26 Similarly, some members of the younger generation found their initial excitement about general theory gave way to disenchantment. A good example is Samuel Beer, America's leading scholar of British politics. In the late 1950s Beer extolled a "structural-functional" theory of the "political system" as the polestar guiding the way to a general comparative political science. 27 But in the early 1960s he changed his mind and began to take aim at the "dogma of universality" and the "utopia of a universal theory." 28 Opposition to general theory involved a repudiation of abstract sociological concepts such as system. Various political scientists began to look to mid-level categories that highlighted more concrete similarities and differences across societies. In the mid-tolate 1970s a generation of scholars, working in a range of literatures, thus rallied round the concept of the state, where the state was conceived at least as much in terms of the new behavioral topics as the elder concept of a sovereign authority. 29 30 The introductory chapter offers the image of an "intellectual sea change," with scholars rejecting "society-centered ways of explaining politics and governmental activities" and converging "on complementary arguments and strategies of analysis" that take seriously the role of states as actors. 31 The neostatists were right that their analytic approach broke with behavioralism, but the break was more limited than they implied. They rejected structural-functional theorizing, and more broadly, the whole project of crafting general theories, and they were wary of cross-national comparative work that took the form of large-N statistical analysis. But they retained the goal of developing theory that was empirical (in the sense of being independent of normative commitments), and centered on generating and testing hypotheses about recurring relations between prior conditions and outcomes. What they preferred to large-N statistical analysis was a program of small-N studies hedged in by "context," but also sufficiently "analytical" to generate and test "mid-range theory." Here Bringing the State Back In advocates a modernist empiricist strategy of crafting midrange theory by using analytic categories to inductively generalize from small-N comparisons and case studies. is applied to him or his American counterparts, it is thus little more than a misnomer for a continuing adherence to mid-level studies of both political institutions and political behavior using modernist forms of explanation.
The problem with mid-level approaches is that they remain at best vague and at worst confused about the logic of their explanations. Like Bulpitt, they oscillate between appeals to the apparently given interests of political actors and appeals to modernist categories such as system, institution, or structure. Their refusal of general theories and micro-level analyses means that they often reify both interests and institutions. Political scientists will avoid such reification only when they break with modernist empiricism, adopting an interpretive approach characterized by decentered theory, new aggregate concepts, and new empirical topics.
New Theory
Political scientists often use terms like "system", "institution", or "structure" to elide questions about how their explanations work. These terms lure political scientists to an unthinking determinism, reification, and foundationalism. Consider, for example, the widespread claim that institutions possess an inertial tendency or stickiness. This claim leads to an unthinking determinism. It implies that there is a causal mechanism that fixes the content or development of an institution albeit by fixing the agency of the relevant people: if agency was not fixed in this way, then the stickiness would appear only when the relevant people happened to act in a certain way, so stickiness would be merely a descriptive term to be applied to such cases, not a term capable of doing explanatory work. What is more, when institutionalists try to make sense of the idea of institutional stickiness, they often fall into the traps of reification or foundationalism. They appear to commit to reification when they imply that the mechanism or feedback process operates independent of intentionality. Alternatively, if they describe the mechanism as a feedback process operating through intentionality, they imply that the relevant people hold correct or rational beliefs about the nature of the institution or about the costs of change in a way that appears to commit them to foundationalism.
It is no accident that mid-level modernist empiricism so often leads to an implicit reification and determinism. Mid-level approaches neglect the micro-level of individual beliefs and actions precisely because they treat social facts as governed by apparently Most interpretive approaches seek to explain social life by reference to historical meanings, and especially the beliefs of actors. Interpretivism encourages political scientists to decenter concepts such as institution, territory, power, and operating code.
To decenter is to focus on the social construction of a practice through the ability of individuals to create and act on meanings. It is generally to reveal the contingent and conflicting beliefs that inform the diverse actions that constitute what otherwise may appear to be a reified practice, institution, or social structure. Thus, for example, a decentered study of a pattern of territorial politics shows how it is created, sustained, and modified through the beliefs, preferences and actions of individuals in many arenas.
New Concepts
Decentered theory points to a disaggregating of concepts like institution, network, or territory in terms of micro-level analyses of individual actions based on an individual's beliefs. But, while such stories are interesting as cases, there are times when we want to tell more general stories. To do so, interpretivists will need new aggregate concepts that overtly refer to common meanings rather than to apparently formal patterns. Perhaps it will help if I give examples of such aggregate concepts, analyzing them in relation to contingent meanings and actions, and indicating where institutionalists often diverge from those analyses.
Practice. A practice is a set of actions, often a set of actions that exhibit a pattern, perhaps even a pattern that remains relatively stable across time. Practices often give us grounds for postulating beliefs, for we can ascribe beliefs to people only in interpreting their actions. Nonetheless, practices cannot explain actions since people act for reasons of their own. People sometimes act on their beliefs about a practice, but, when they do, we still explain their action by reference to their beliefs about the practice, and, of course, these beliefs need not be accurate.
There is a sense in which practices can constitute the consequences of actions.
The effects of actions often depend on the responses of others. So, if we equate a practice with the set of actions by which others respond to an act, then, by definition, that practice constitutes the consequences of the act. Still, we should remember here that the practice is composed solely of the contingent actions of individuals. Hence, it is these actions in their diversity and contingency that constitute the consequences of the action, and we explain these actions by reference to the beliefs and desires of the relevant actors, rather than by reference to the practice itself.
When political scientists appeal to "institutions", they often evoke something akin to a practice, while ascribing to it a constraining power greater than my analysis allows.
If they do want to ascribe such constraining power to practices, they need to specify what they mean by constraint and how exactly practices constrain actions. Clearly practicesor at least the actions of others -constrain the effects, and so effectiveness, of an action.
What remains unclear is how practices could constrain the actions people might attempt to perform.
Power. An interpretive approach should avoid a concept of power that refers to social relations based on interests that people allegedly have outside of the particular traditions by which they make sense of the world; it should do so because people always Dilemma. A dilemma is any experience or idea that conflicts with someone's beliefs and so forces them to alter the beliefs they inherit as a tradition. It combines with the tradition to explain (although not determine) the beliefs people go on to adopt and so the actions they go on to perform. Dilemmas and traditions cannot fully explain actions both because actions are informed by desires as well as beliefs and because people are agents who respond creatively to any given dilemma. Although dilemmas sometimes arise from experiences of the world, we cannot equate them with the world as it is because experiences are always theory-laden. Like meanings in general, dilemmas are always subjective or inter-subjective. Institutionalists sometimes adopt concepts such as dilemma or pressure to refer to the sources of change, but they appear then to equate such pressures with objective facts about the world rather than the subjective beliefs of policy actors, and if they are to define pressures in this way, they need an analysis of how these pressures lead people to change their beliefs and actions -they need to argue either that people are bound to experience a pressure as it is, or that a pressure leads to new actions (and so presumably beliefs) even though the actor has no subjective awareness of it.
New Topics
An interpretive alternative to Bulpitt's modernist empiricism counters the Toryism lurking in his narrative of British territorial politics. An interpretive approach may retain the emphasis on behavioral topics rather than formal institutions, and it may thus reinforce the image of Britain as far more differentiated than the straightforwardly unitary state of the Westminster Model. However, an interpretive approach entails a concern with contests among diverse and contingent meanings. This concern may lead to an increasing focus on new empirical topics, including elite narratives, governmentalities, and popular resistance. Exciting new agendas for political science arise if we continue to pursue the shift from institutional to behavioral and cultural topics but adopt an interpretive alternative to modernist empiricism. The interpretive alternative reconceives territorial politics not in terms of elites pursuing fixed interests through their statecraft, but as a contest among diverse groups promoting different narratives and policies inspired by different traditions 27 and responding to various dilemmas that change over time. And the interpretive approach thereby raises new topics for political scientists to explore, including the different narratives that inspire elites, the role of social science in constructing knowledge and policy, and the local traditions in terms of which street level bureaucrats and citizens respond to policies and even remake them.
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